The Judgment of PAROS: How Best to Prevent an Arms Race in Outer Space (SWP 19) by Meyer, Paul
 The Judgment of PAROS: How Best to Prevent 







Simons Papers in Security and Development 
No. 19/2012 | March 2012 




The Simons Papers in Security and Development are edited and published at the School for 
International Studies, Simon Fraser University. The papers serve to disseminate research work in 
progress by the School’s faculty and associated and visiting scholars. Our aim is to encourage the 
exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the series should not limit 
subsequent publication in any other venue. All papers can be downloaded free of charge from 
our website, www.sfu.ca/internationalstudies. 
 
The series is supported in part by The Simons Foundation. 
 
Series editor: Jeffrey T. Checkel 






Meyer, Paul, The Judgment of PAROS: How Best to Prevent an Arms Race in Outer Space, 
Simons Papers in Security and Development, No. 19/2012, School for International Studies, 
Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, March 2012. 
 
ISSN  1922-5725 
 
 
Copyright remains with the author. Reproduction for other purposes than personal research, 
whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s). If cited or quoted, 
reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), the title, the working paper number 
and year, and the publisher. 
 






School for International Studies  
Simon Fraser University 
Suite 7200 - 515 West Hastings Street 
Vancouver, BC Canada V6B 5K3 
 
  
             The Judgment of PAROS: How Best to Prevent an Arms Race in Outer Space    3 
 
The Judgment of PAROS: How Best to Prevent an Arms Race in 
Outer Space 
Simons Papers in Security and Development 




The international community will soon need to judge as to what measures should be 
agreed to prevent an arms race in outer space. The world depends increasingly on 
services provided by space-based assets and recent anti-satellite weapon tests have raised 
the prospect of space becoming a weaponized conflict zone. Several diplomatic proposals 
have been made by Russia, China, Canada and the EU aimed at reinforcing the present 
regime for outer space security. The leading space power, the United States, has for 
several years remained on the sidelines, neither endorsing any of the existing proposals 
nor advancing ideas of its own. Domestic political considerations appear to be hampering 
the Obama Administration’s capacity to engage actively in the current outer space 
diplomacy. Early in 2012 however, it declared support for an International Code of 
Conduct on Outer Space Activities based on an earlier EU draft. Such a draft, despite its 
modest security content, offers a promising array of mechanisms for international 
cooperation on outer space security at a time when the world depends increasingly on the 
unimpeded operation of some one thousand satellites. 
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The Judgment of PAROS: How Best to Prevent an Arms Race 
in Outer Space 
In the classical Greek myth, Paris, a shepherd youth, is obliged to choose the most 
beautiful amongst three goddesses. It was a daunting task for a mere mortal who seemed well 
aware that he would risk the displeasure of the two celestial dieses not selected in this beauty 
contest. There are some parallels to Paris’s dilemma and that of the international community 
faced with the question of how best to prevent an arms race in outer space (or PAROS according 
to the inevitable acronym). Although sometimes viewed as remote a threat strategically as its 
subject is physically, the relatively benign environment of outer space cannot be taken for 
granted. Growth in the use of outer space by humanity has been constant since the ushering in of 
the space age over 50 years ago. Today it is estimated that there are some 1,000 satellites in 
operation, owned by over 60 states. No longer is exploitation of outer space the preserve of a 
small group of advanced industrialized states. A dozen states currently have the capacity to place 
an object into orbit and an even larger number own and/or operate satellites. Developing 
countries are increasingly to be found beside developed ones in possessing satellites and 
practically every country on the globe is a consumer of space-based services in some form or the 
other.  
A wide array of functions, from remote sensing of ecological and weather activity, to 
communication and navigation services are being performed via space-based assets. Up until 
now, these assets have not been threatened and have been able to operate freely. Outer space has 
been treated as a global commons, “the province of all mankind”, the use of which shall be for 
“peaceful purposes” and “carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries”. These 
quotations are from the preamble and Article 1 of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the most 
important international treaty governing outer space.
1
 Its promotion of peaceful purposes in outer 
space is reinforced by provisions precluding national appropriation of space (thus avoiding 
potential conflicts over sovereign claims) and the placement of any weapon of mass destruction 
in outer space. However the Outer Space Treaty does not specifically exclude non-WMD type 
 Simons Papers in Security and Development No. 19/2012        6 
 
weapons from being deployed in space and its “peaceful purposes” constraint has not prevented 
extensive military, alongside civilian, use of outer space. States have chosen to consider military 
use of space as compatible with the purposes of the Outer Space Treaty to the extent that this use 
has not entailed offensive military action being conducted in or from space. Thus current debate 
over the adequacy of the Outer Space Treaty as the international legal foundation for regulating 
outer space behaviour has drawn a distinction between ‘militarization’ of space and its 
“weaponization”. By the latter term, is meant the actual deployment of space-based weapons 
which would be utilized to conduct destructive operations against other space-based assets or 
targets on the ground. While ‘militarization’ has occurred for some time now, ‘weaponization’ 
has not and many states believe that it should be prevented and thereby remove the risk that outer 
space, like the more terrestrial environments of land, sea and air, becomes a potential 
battleground for inter-state warfare.  
Such concerns have animated states for some time and the issue of “the prevention of an 
arms race in outer space” has been on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly and 
its associated multilateral negotiating forum, the Conference on Disarmament, since the early 
1980s. A resolution on PAROS has been adopted annually by the General Assembly since that 
period, with the latest version (A66/27) approved in December 2011 by a vote of 176 in favour, 
none opposed and two abstentions (the US and Israel). The chief elements of the resolution 
affirm: 1) that through PAROS, the world can avert “a grave danger for international peace and 
security”; 2) that the current legal regime applicable to outer space “does not in and of itself 
guarantee PAROS” and that “there is a need to consolidate and reinforce that regime and 
enhance its effectiveness”; and 3) the Conference on Disarmament should “establish a working 
group” under its agenda item on PAROS “as early as possible”. It is noteworthy as well that in 
the preamble of the resolution the General Assembly declares that “further measures should be 
examined in the search for effective and verifiable bilateral and multilateral agreements in order 
to prevent an arms race in outer space, including the weaponization of outer space”.2 The 
declared policy of the vast majority of states therefore is that any arms race or weaponization of 
outer space should be prevented, that the existing legal regime is inadequate to ensure this and 
that effective prevention will require further measures. What these measures should consist of is 
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not specified in the resolution, but there are positive references to both verifiable agreements and 
confidence-building measures (CBM).  
The sustained and almost universal support for the PAROS resolution suggests that states 
do not believe that a continuation of the current, broadly benign situation in outer space can be 
taken for granted. Several man-made threats to the peaceful enjoyment of outer space have 
recently underscored the potential vulnerability of satellites and the risk to international security 
in general if a state decided to pursue a more belligerent course of action. The threat posed to 
space craft from the growing amount of space debris orbiting the globe has been receiving 
greater attention. The accidental collision of a US and a Russian satellite in 2009 on top of 
several earlier debris clouds generated by accidental explosions of launch vehicles has 
contributed to increased risk through expanding the quantity of space debris in orbit. For 
example, by the end of 2009, the total number of large and medium-sized objects greater than 10 
cm and tracked by the US Space Surveillance Network was 15,096. This represented a 15% 
increase over the total at the end of 2008. Given the orbital speed of this debris, which in Low 
Earth Orbit (LEO) can attain velocities of up to 7.8 km per second, even small debris items 
contain massive kinetic energy (a 10 cm piece in LEO carries the same kinetic energy as a 
35,000 kg truck travelling at a speed of 190 km/hour). Such debris poses a growing risk to space 
craft especially those operating in LEO. A US National Research Council study of the problem, 
warned that “growth in the amount of debris threatens to make some valuable orbital regions 
increasingly inhospitable to space operations over the next few decades”.3 
Even more troubling than these debris-producing accidents, were the ASAT (anti-satellite 
weapon) tests conducted by China in 2007 and the US in 2008 (although presented as an 
intervention required for public safety, the US action in February 2008 of destroying a de-
orbiting satellite demonstrated a ASAT capability irrespective of its true motivation). These tests, 
particularly the Chinese one which produced a large cloud of enduring debris at a high altitude, 
revived long-dormant fears that ASAT weapons were being developed and tested and might be 
harbingers of a new threat of destructive offensive action against space-based assets. These fears 
had been dormant since the mid-1980s when both the USSR and the US ceased testing earlier 
ASAT systems they had developed. Although ballistic missile defence systems designed for exo-
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atmospheric interceptions have an inherent ASAT-capability, the specific targeting of a satellite 
with a destructive “kinetic kill vehicle” as carried out in the 2007 and 2008 events broke with a 
tacit moratorium on such activity which had endured for over two decades. These developments 
if repeated or replicated by others could erode the nascent norm against space weaponization and 
open up the prospect of satellites being subject to destructive attack. To try and foreclose this 
prospect has been the objective of several diplomatic initiatives which can be grouped under the 
PAROS rubric.  
For those states which have sought to give a more operational character to the declaratory 
policy articulated in the annual PAROS resolutions, there have been basically two avenues of 
multilateral diplomacy to pursue. The first is the negotiation of a treaty which would preclude or 
regulate in some manner the use of force against objects in space. The second is the development 
of political arrangements, often referred to as confidence building measures (CBM) which would 
aim to promote state behaviour compatible with the goals of PAROS and the non-weaponization 
of outer space. Both of these variants are also possible through bilateral diplomacy of course, but 
the ‘global commons’ aspect of outer space makes multilateral approaches all the more pertinent 
and legitimate. Each of these possible avenues, treaties or CBMs, have their advantages and 
disadvantages, and not surprisingly the recent discussion of PAROS in multilateral forums has 
largely been a debate between adherents of either option. Given the consensus basis for much 
multilateral decision-making, this lack of agreement over which approach would be most 
effective has hampered efforts to forge new norms for responsible behaviour in outer space. 
Concerns over the further deterioration of the operating environment in outer space including 
precedent-setting offensive action in space, are increasing the pressure on concerned states to 
overcome differences and support some preventative measures. This article will proceed to 
assess the four chief proposals currently before multilateral forums and suggest a way forward. 
These proposals are: the draft treaty on Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space 
formally presented by Russia and China in 2008 and known by the acronym (PPWT); the Code 
of Conduct for Outer Space Activity put forward by the European Union initially in 2008 with a 
revised version circulated in 2010; security-related CBMs such as those presented by Canada in 
2009; as well as other measures which have been suggested pursuant to a Russian-led initiative 
within the UN to solicit ideas for Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBM). 
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The role of the United States, as the leading space-faring nation, in determining which of the 
above diplomatic options will likely be taken up, will also be assessed. After years of relative 
stasis, the diplomacy of outer space security seems poised to advance again and supplement the 
normative base for responsible state behaviour as currently enshrined in the Outer Space Treaty.  
The Russian–Chinese Draft Treaty 
The principal treaty proposal before the international community is the Russian-Chinese 
draft entitled “Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the 
Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects” or PPWT. It has had a lengthy gestation 
period since its initial introduction as a working paper at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) 
in Geneva in 2002. The current draft was formally presented to the CD in February 2008 by the 
Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov.
4
 In his remarks, Mr Lavrov stressed the fact that any 
weapon deployment in outer space would “inevitably trigger a chain reaction” and urged the CD 
to seize the initiative on PAROS as “preventing a threat is always easier than removing it”.5 The 
Chinese Ambassador to the CD conveyed a supporting message from his Foreign Minister, Yang 
Jiechi, which noted that “preventing the weaponization of outer space...and ensuring the peace 
and tranquility of outer space are goals consistent with the shared interests of all countries. It is 
therefore essential that the international community develop new legal instruments to strengthen 
the existing legal regime on outer space”.6  
The PPWT is a spare draft with its principal objective set out in Article II, which 
commits states parties “not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds of 
weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies and not to place such weapons in outer 
space in any other manner; not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects”; 
thereby extending the Outer Space Treaty’s prohibition on placing WMD in outer space to cover 
all forms of weapons. Although the treaty contains no verification provision it does suggest 
verification measures could form the subject of an additional protocol. The draft treaty also 
acknowledges that agreed confidence-building measures should be implemented on a voluntary 
basis, but does not specify any CBMs. These two points are somewhat awkwardly contained in 
Article VI of the draft having been put there apparently in response to earlier comments received 
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from other delegations. The most extensive critique of the PPWT however was provided by the 
delegation of the United States, which submitted an official document in August, 2008 detailing 
a series of shortcomings and ambiguities in the draft treaty.
7
 In particular the US analysis pointed 
to the lack of any constraints on terrestrial-based anti-satellite weapons, and the limitation of 
constraints on space-based weapons to their deployment. Referring to certain definitional gaps, 
the US paper also suggested that the PPWT would not have stopped China’s testing of an ASAT 
weapon against its own satellite as per the 11 January 2007 event, nor prevent an ASAT test 
against another country’s space object as long as this activity avoided physical impact. Although 
these questions and others would naturally be pursued in follow-up discussion of the PPWT, this 
has not been possible at the CD. With little prospect of the Conference overcoming its decade 
long impasse over achieving consensus agreement on a programme of work, there has been no 
official venue for taking up the PPWT. Although regretting this protracted gridlock in CD, 
neither Russia nor China has as yet indicated a willingness to remove the PPWT from the ambit 
of the CD and try to advance it in another forum.  
The EU Code of Conduct 
In December 2008, the European Union presented its own proposal for reinforcing the 
outer space regime in the form of a “Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities”. This draft 
code has been the subject of extensive consultations, both within and beyond the EU and a 
revised version of the Code was approved by the European Council in October 2010 as a basis 
for further discussion with third countries.
8
 Prompted by the unsettling ASAT tests of 2007 and 
2008 and no doubt influenced by the PPWT and its cool reception by the US, the EU Code 
sought to pursue the path of least resistance while still aiming to complement the existing legal 
regime for outer space with a series of CBMs. Modelled to some degree on the existing Hague 
Code of Conduct for Ballistic Missiles of 2002, the EU Code is a political arrangement which by 
definition avoids the more binding nature of an international legal agreement. By eschewing a 
treaty approach, the Code also facilitates adoption as states are not obliged to submit it to 
ratification processes which can be both time-consuming and politically problematic (a feature 
designed to appeal to Washington in particular). The Code, as indicated in its preamble, presents 
itself as “a set of best practices aimed at ensuring security in outer space” and “a useful 
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complement to international space law”.9 The Code in contrast to the PPWT is an expansively 
written document with a substantial preamble, several general principles and a comprehensive 
reaffirmation of existing treaties and commitments relating to outer space activity. Many of the 
measures enumerated in the Code reiterate commitments already undertaken in other 
instruments, resolutions or arrangements. Despite frequent references to security the contents of 
the Code are focused essentially on safety aspects of space operations and there is no measure 
with a purely security character. The area where the Code breaks some new ground and 
potentially could contribute to strengthening outer space security is in its information-sharing, 
consultative and organisational provisions. Article 8 specifies an annual exchange of information 
by the subscribing states on, inter alia, “their space policies and strategies, including basic 
objectives for security and defence related activities in outer space”.10 Article 9 outlines a 
consultative mechanism, which is significantly broader than that set out in the Outer Space 
Treaty and which is to operate under more rigorous parameters: “working jointly and 
cooperatively in a timeframe sufficiently urgent to mitigate or eliminate the identified risk 
initially triggering the consultations”. Intriguingly, the Code in Article 9.2 envisages the creation 
of a mechanism; staffed with international experts, to investigate incidents and provide advisory 
findings and recommendations (the current text however indicates that this mechanism is “to be 
determined at a later stage”).11 
Under the final section of the Code, entitled “Organisational aspects” there are several 
more action-oriented steps which could in theory yield significant dividends in terms of 
enhanced confidence levels concerning outer space. Article 10 provides for a biennial meeting of 
subscribing states “to define, review and further develop this Code and ensure its effective 
implementation” Article 11 specifies the nomination of a “central point of contact” which would 
seem to have the role of a secretariat with responsibility for maintaining an electronic 
information sharing system and organizing meetings. Finally, Article 12 stipulates the creation of 
“an electronic database and communications system” the exact nature of which is not clear from 
the text, but which would serve as a mechanism for channelling consultation requests as well as 
ensuring the collection and dissemination of notifications and information pursuant to the 
Code.
12
 This collectively represents a degree of institutionalisation not found in the Outer Space 
Treaty and one that is unusual for non-treaty based arrangements. How such structures and 
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mechanisms would work in practice is difficult to predict and clearly would be a function of the 
extent of compliance of the subscribing states with the Code’s provisions. The experience of the 
Hague Code of Conduct is not necessarily promising in that regard as many of its subscribing 
states failed to follow through with its notification and information sharing provisions. The 
record on voluntary reporting and submission of information under other international 
agreements in the arms control and disarmament field (e.g. NPT, BWC) is also not especially 
encouraging. That said the possibility of more regular exchanges between states on outer space 
issues and the establishment of consultative processes which could be utilized for preventative 
diplomacy and problem-solving could help to promote responsible state behaviour and reinforce 
outer space security norms.  
The EU has been extremely cautious in its rolling out of the Code. Earlier suggestions 
that an ad hoc diplomatic conference would be convened in 2011 to adopt the Code have been 
supplanted by longer time horizons. The departure last summer of the official, Ms. Annalisa 
Giannella , heading up the responsible security policy directorate of the EU’s European External 
Action Service has contributed to a slippage in the timetable for organizing a conference to adopt 
the Code and the current intentions of the EU with respect to its initiative are far from clear.  
The EU is understandably anxious to line-up significant international support for the 
Code before moving ahead to convene a diplomatic conference. It will be crucial to get the US 
on board for the exercise and although the Obama Administration has been positively 
considering the Code for over three years, it has only recently come to a decision regarding the 
Code. That decision came on 17 January 2012 when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
announced that “the United States has decided to join with the European Union and other nations 
to develop an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities”.13 At present, the exact 
import of this statement is not clear – is the US partnering with the EU or appropriating the 
European initiative? It would seem that the Administration, ever sensitive to its domestic 
political vulnerabilities, has felt obliged, in this election year, to moderate its earlier public 
expressions of interest in the EU Code. Political opposition to the EU Code had already been 
expressed in a February 2011 letter from 37 Republican senators headed by Senator Kyl voicing 
concern over the Code and the fact that the Administration was not bringing it before the 




 It is also evident that other influential space-faring nations such as 
India, China and Brazil are sceptical about the Code and its “Made in Brussels” label. Part of the 
delay in the timeframe for obtaining approval of the Code can be attributed to the EU effort to 
pursue consultations with the states which remain cool towards the initiative. Concerns regarding 
the Code which can be expected to be raised by other states, include its non-legally binding 
character, its lack of measures with real security content, its genesis as a EU product rather than 
an arrangement jointly developed in a broader UN forum and the costs associated with its 
institutional mechanisms which presumably are to be borne by the subscribing states. It is not yet 
clear whether, in light of the long-delayed US public response to the Code, the EU will now back 
away from its initiative and defer to Washington or sustain engagement alongside the US in 
seeking wider acceptance for the draft Code. Regardless of who is leading a renewed diplomatic 
effort, differences of view on the substance of a draft Code will continue to represent a challenge 
for the sponsors.  
Canada’s Security-related CBMs 
Canada has long been active in outer space security diplomacy and has been one of the 
few states to have submitted working papers and specific proposals at the CD and the UN. 
Building upon earlier suggestions for enhancing space security and In light of the absence of 
security content in the EU’s draft Code, Canada proposed in 2009 the adoption of a series of 
pledges by states to refrain from actions which would threaten space security. The three specific 
pledges were: 1) not to test or use a weapon against any satellite so as to damage or destroy it; 2) 
not to place any weapon in outer space; and 3) not to use a satellite itself as a weapon. An 
additional advantage to this approach, according to the Canadian submission, was that it would 
eliminate the need to define the term “weapon” (the lack of such a definition was one of the 
problems identified with the PPWT), “since the effects of the weapon are included within the 
proposed prohibitions”.15 While possessing the same convenience of the EU Code’s political 
arrangements over legally-binding ones, the Canadian suggestions addressed the core security 
concerns regarding the weaponization of space that had prompted the PPWT and in that sense 
were conceived as representing a middle course between the two other options. These ideas have 
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not been promoted actively by the Canadian government subsequently however and have not 




Russia’s Transparency and Confidence Building Measures (TCBM) Initiative 
The other main source of proposals relating to outer space security has emerged from a 
Russian-led initiative to solicit ideas for TCBMs. Since 2005, Russia has led on a resolution in 
the UN General Assembly calling for the submission of concrete proposals for outer space 
TCBMs. This resolution (the latest substantive version A/RES/65/68 was adopted by the General 
Assembly 8 December 2011) has received wide support (only the US failed to approve it last 
year) and has yielded several compilations of submissions by states.
17
 While only some two 
dozen states have made submissions and few of these have presented concrete proposals there 
has been general endorsement of TCBMs as a means of reinforcing the outer space regime. 
Russia, as the author of the resolution, has generated the most proposed TCBMs including most 
recently a proposal for the “exchange of information on foreseeable dangerous situations in outer 
space”. Suggestions from other states have included pre-launch notifications, invitation of 
observers to space launches, information exchanges on outer space policy and programs and the 
creation of mechanism to verify outer space activities. Certain states (e.g. China and Cuba) have 
made the point in their submissions that TCBMs are no substitute for arms control and 
disarmament measures contained in legally binding international instruments.  
More significant than the national submissions generated to date, the latest resolution also 
authorised the establishment of a UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to conduct a study 
starting in 2012 on outer space TCBMs and to report back to the General Assembly in 2013. The 
convening of a GGE has frequently been a precursor in the UN system to the adoption of more 
developed arrangements or instruments at a later stage. As GGEs work on the basis of consensus, 
the possibility of having a substantive report and recommendations will be a function of 
achieving agreement from amongst all the members of the GGE (usually some 12 to 15 
individuals ostensibly operating in their personal capacity but normally reflecting national 
positions). At a minimum the activation of a GGE on the subject of outer space TCBMs will 
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draw attention to the subject matter, even though there is no guarantee that it will be able to 
produce agreed and significant recommendations for action.  
The US on the Sidelines 
The US is conspicuous by its absence in this survey of the principal international 
proposals for reinforcing the outer space security regime. As the leading space power and a chief 
architect of much of the existing multilateral framework for international security, it would have 
been expected for the US to be suggesting some measures of its own. Policy development on 
outer space security has not been forthcoming from the US national security establishment in 
recent years. There has been a lengthy transition from the Bush Administration and its belief that 
the existing legal order in outer space was adequate and that arms control had no place in outer 
space, to the new policy stance of the Obama Administration. That policy itself has been a long 
time in coming and its contents have not supplied the innovation or grand direction that the 
international community might have expected. The National Space Policy (NSP) released by the 
Obama Administration in June 2010 was a spare document and quite laconic when it came to 
describing what measures the US wanted to see in outer space. The NSP stated that the US will 
pursue TCBMs but provides no guidance as to what the nature of these measures should be. The 
NSP is even less forthcoming when it comes to possible arms control measures, noting that it 
would “consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, 
effectively verifiable and enhance the national security of the US and its allies”.18 The NSP 
seems to be putting the onus on others to come up with the proposals which would meet its high 
bar and makes no contribution of its own to outer space arms control, suggesting continuity with 
the Bush Administration’s aversion to such action.  
The NSP was followed in February 2011 by a National Security Space Strategy (NSSS) 
released jointly by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence. This 
Strategy did not shed much more light on the outer space security diplomacy the US would 
pursue. While it did call for “a stable space environment in which nations exercise shared 
responsibility to act as stewards of the space domain and follow norms of behaviour”,19 it 
provided scant guidance on how the US intended to bring this about. Significantly, while the 
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NSSS describes space as congested, contested and competitive, it fails to depict it as also an 
environment for cooperative action. Besides endorsing the notion of responsible behaviour by 
states in outer space, the NSSS like the NSP before it, lacks a diplomatic game plan for realising 
this desired state of affairs. At the press conference launching the NSSS, Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Lynn avoided a question from a journalist as to whether the US was developing arms 
control proposals of its own. Later in the same conference, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Space Policy, Greg Schulte, explained that “the focus of the administration really is 
on promoting what we like to call transparency and confidence-building measures, which tend to 
be voluntary as opposed to legally-binding”.20 The only such TCBM which appeared to 
command any attention on the part of the Administration is the aforementioned EU Code of 
Conduct. At the February 2011 NSSS press conference and elsewhere, Administration officials 
have made positive noises about the EU Code and have said it was under study. This protracted 
“examination” of the EU Code and associated failure to publicly pronounce on it has been 
ascribed to reluctance on the part of the US to sign up to the Code before it has garnered greater 
acceptance worldwide. Another explanation is that the “not invented here” character of the EU 
Code made the Administration leery of endorsing it, until such time as it was able to re-package 
the idea as an American initiative.  
The Administration’s drawn-out tease over whether to embrace the EU Code is also 
conditioned by its anxiety over rousing opposition from domestic political foes as evidenced in 
the salvo represented by the letter of concern from Senator Kyl and 36 other Republican 
senators. This concern that an Administration endorsement of the EU Code could prove to be an 
electoral liability may help explain the assertion in the Secretary of State’s press release 
expressing support for an international Code, “that we will not enter into a code of conduct that 
in any way constrains our national security-related activities in space”.21 Given that all 
significant international security accords involve some degree of (mutual) constraint, this 
declaration does not augur well for devising a meaningful Code of Conduct. The protracted 
ambivalence over the EU Code coupled with the absence of alternative “Made in the USA” 
proposals until the ambiguous announcement in January 2012 of US intention to develop an 
International Code suggests that US outer space security policy will remain on hold over the next 
months and probably until after the elections.  
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The political sensitivity of this subject was manifested again when the day after Secretary 
Clinton’s announcement, Senators Kyl and Sessions and Congressmen Turner and Heck sent a 
letter to the President expressing concern that Congressional prerogatives were being ignored if 
the Administration pursued negotiation of a measure similar to the EU Code of Conduct. 
According to its authors, any eventual Code would engage regulations which would have 
implications for national security and interstate commerce in a way requiring Congressional 
involvement. In the opinion of one commentator, “Congress has drawn a legal line in the sand, 
and the Administration must choose whether to stop short of that line and include Congress in 
the process of negotiating the Code or step over it and risk the wrath of Congress’s asserted 
commerce power.”22 In a possible effort to fend off such an eventual challenge while not 
conceding Executive Branch prerogatives, the State Department in a release accompanying the 
Secretary’s announcement stated: “The Administration is committed to keeping the US Congress 
informed as our consultations with the space faring community progress”.23  
In addition to being sensitive to potential political opposition, the Administration’s tepid 
involvement on the outer space security file to date suggests divided counsel as to the priority to 
be accorded this aspect of its international security policy. On the one hand, senior 
Administration officials are making the case for some enhanced international cooperation to 
sustain a benign space environment. In a recent article, Deputy Secretary of Defense Lynn has 
stressed the dependency of the US on space systems for successful war fighting and warned that 
“without them many of our most important military advantages evaporate”.24 On the other hand, 
the Administration seems unable to extrapolate from this appreciation of the existing outer space 
environment, a substantive diplomatic strategy for securing and strengthening it. When Deputy 
Secretary Lynn addresses the diplomatic dimension in his article, there is only a reiteration of the 
passive mode of considering other states’ ideas: “we are assessing diplomatic initiatives such as 
the EU Code of Conduct to promote international norms of responsible behaviour”.25 The 
Secretary of State’s ambivalent statement on the Code (is it a dismissal of the EU proposal or its 
appropriation?) does not really help the Administration to get off the picket fence of outer space 
security policy. Declaring support in the abstract for an international Code of Conduct without 
promoting a specific proposal does little to advance the multilateral consideration of potential 
measures to reinforce outer space security. In the absence of a specific diplomatic initiative, on 
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substance or process, the US will probably be unable to ensure the enhanced cooperation and 
shared responsible state behaviour it is espousing in its declaratory policy.  
To Whom the Golden Apple? 
The present stasis in the global outer space security regime is unlikely to last too much 
longer. External developments have revived the spectre of the weaponization of space at the 
same time as several diplomatic processes have matured. Of the diplomatic options surveyed 
above, the one that seems ripest for fulfillment is the EU Code of Conduct on Outer Space 
Activities. This is a modest, but potentially important contribution to revitalizing international 
awareness of, and engagement in, preserving a space environment which permits sustained and 
secure access for all. The Code also has the advantage of a low transactional threshold, being a 
politically binding arrangement rather than a treaty that avoids the need for domestic ratification 
with its attendant delays and political challenges. The EU’s own lethargic promotion of the Code 
over the last few years may however have dimmed its prospects for adoption. The implication 
that Washington may now want to assume leadership of a renewed effort to develop an 
International Code could effectively side-line the EU’s initiative. Alternatively, the EU may 
gladly concede paternity for a Code if it means that the US will seriously engage in promoting 
one, including using its influence on sceptics and those states which have been cool to the EU 
effort.  
For most states with an interest in outer space security having some initial stabilizing 
steps agreed to will be welcomed. The Code’s relative advantage over its rivals in this regard lies 
more in their flaws than its strengths. The Russian–Chinese PPWT faces strong opposition from 
some quarters and is a victim of the general paralysis of the CD where its sponsors have chosen 
to consign it. Canada has failed to promote its proposed security pledges and there has been little 
pick up of these ideas by other states which either favour a non-weaponization treaty or a less-
demanding set of CBMs. Russia has successfully built support for its general study of TCBMs in 
the UN context, but cannot expect to displace the EU’s Code in the near term, given the fact that 
the recommendations of the UN GGE will not appear until 2013, and then only if a consensus 
agreement can be reached by its diverse membership.  
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In substance, the Code is far from a panacea for the current strategic vulnerabilities faced 
by the outer space environment. However, its promulgation, if sufficiently supported, would 
represent a significant step forward in strengthening the outer space security regime. In 
particular, it would reinforce the norm of non-interference with the assets and operations of 
states in outer space. The Code’s institutional mechanisms could also, if implemented, create a 
pattern of cooperation and consultation which would be beneficial for sustaining a benign space 
environment. These political and indirect benefits of a widely subscribed to Code of Conduct 
may provide, in the near term, the best way of preventing an arms race in outer space and justify 
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